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This paper describes the privatisation and deregulation programs in the Netherlands during 
the period 1982-2002, that is, under the governments headed by Lubbers (1982-1994) and 
Kok (1994-2002). The paper explains that the Dutch define privatisation as “making use of 
private interests and market forces”, which differs from the international convention, but it 
discusses both forms of “privatisation”. It describes the general frameworks that have guided 
Dutch policy (essentially: privatise whenever this does not jeopardise the public interests) and 
shows that actual policy deviated considerably from the official line. By means of a detailed 
discussion of various network sectors (post and telecommunications, energy and public 
transport) it is shown that issues of market design and transition management received 
insufficient attention. Also remarkable is the lack of detailed empirical studies of the effects 
of the various policies pursued. (JEL Codes L3, L4, L9)  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In its May 2002 survey of the Dutch economy, under the heading “The rule of 
common sense”, The Economist writes:  
 
  “In the spirit of their pragmatic traditions, the Dutch have understood and accepted two things 
that many other Europeans find doctrinally objectionable. One is that it does not matter who 
delivers public services, so long as the job is well done; the other is that competition, in some 
form, can help to make that more likely.” (The Economist, 2002) 
 
When confronted with the question about how to divide responsibilities between the State and 
the private sector in reaching public policy goals, the Dutch indeed have always taken, and 
still take, a pragmatic attitude. The most recent (December 2003) parliamentary discussion on 
State participations provides a nice illustration: after the representatives of the major political 
parties had stated their overall party positions, the responsible Minister, Zalm, responded 
with: “I like the fact that one can have such nice ideological discussions about this topic, 
however, we have to try to bring these back to practical proportions.” (Kamerstukken, 2003-
2004a, p. 10)  
 
The Dutch pragmatic attitude may be explained by the fact that in the Netherlands it 
has always been necessary to form coalition governments. Pragmatic policy, of course, runs 
the danger of being ad hoc. While, to some extent, the Dutch have run into this trap, Dutch 
pragmatism has been disciplined by the view, held by the majority (i.e. the Christian 
Democrats and the Liberals), that the primary role of the State is to facilitate citizens and 
firms to go about their own business; that the State should intervene only when there is 
market failure and that, in these cases, private interests should be mobilised for the public 
cause as much as possible. Traditionally, the religious groups in society have had their own 
social organisations and institutions, they wanted to maintain their identity and independence 
and preferred to keep government interference low. Of course, they also sought political 
power to get the State to co-finance their own activities. Being aware of this political reality, 
in the 1930s, the Labour Party, under the influence of Jan Tinbergen, explicitly expressed a 
preference for planning of economic activities above nationalisation of industries. As a 
consequence, there is relatively little involvement of the State in the supply side of the 
economy and there is a preference to reach public policy goals by using instruments such as   4
subsidisation, contracting, or regulation: the Dutch State is small in terms of the activities it 
performs, but large in terms of the financial claims it lays on society. The Dutch State acts 
more as a financier than as a producer.  
 
The Dutch preference for private provision of public services, subject to government 
regulation and subsidisation, can probably best be illustrated by the important case of 
education. In the Netherlands, only about 30% of all pupils attends public schools and 70% of 
the schools are privately owned. Parents are free to decide to which school to send their kids 
to and schools are paid on the basis of the number of pupils that they have, hence, there is 
competition between schools. The system resulted from religious groups arguing that they 
should not be forced to pay both for their own private schools as well as to subsidize the 
public ones. They insisted on equal treatment of public and private schools, which they 
achieved in 1920. Article 23 of the Dutch Constitution states: 
 
  “Education shall be the constant concern of the Government. All persons shall be free to provide 
education, without prejudice to the authorities’ right of supervision (...) Private primary schools 
that satisfy the conditions laid down by Act of Parliament shall be financed from public funds 
according to the same standards as public authority schools (...)” 
 
The principle expressed here has also been applied in relation to other public services, 
such as health care, welfare work, housing and the media. The first question to be addressed 
always is: is there a need for the government to step in, or can (groups in) society take care of 
the problem itself? Given the political preferences stated above, the answer will frequently be 
“no”. Secondly, even if there is a public interest, hence, a need for the State to intervene, it 
will be investigated whether there is room for the private sector. As a result, although the 
share of government expenditures in GDP is large (government expenditures being 46.4% in 
2001), the public sector is not large in terms of employment or output, with several “core 
public goods” being provided by private parties, usually non-profits. For example, 75% of the 
hospitals are private not-for-profits, and of the stock of social housing only 1,5% is rented out 
by government agencies. As a consequence, the Dutch economy has a large non-profit sector 
(good for about 13 percent of all non-agricultural jobs and 10 percent of GDP), which is 
financed to a large extent (59 percent) by the state, and which provides service on a 
competitive basis; see SCP (2001). 
   5
The above policy principle has important consequences for terminology. If one defines 
“privatisation” as “transferring ownership of assets from the State to the private sector”, the 
Netherlands has seen relatively little of it, simply since very few government assets could be 
privatised. In fact, while asset sales have taken place, this was not labelled as privatisation 
since just transferring ownership is believed not to affect the outcome: government firms are 
assumed to be operating as ordinary profit maximising enterprises. In line with the above 
principle, in the Netherlands, “privatisation” is defined more broadly as “making more use of 
private actors and the market mechanism to achieve public goals” (Boorsma, 1984; WRR 
2000). Defined in this way, privatisation naturally links up with attempts to introduce more 
competition in the provision of public services and as such it has been a hot topic of general 
and political discussion during the last two decades in the 20
th century, under the governments 
of Lubbers (1982-1994) and Kok (1994-2002). In this paper, I will describe and discuss the 
Dutch experiences during this period. 
 
When, in 1982, the first Lubbers cabinet came into office, as a result of the oil crises 
and “Dutch disease”, the Dutch welfare state had grown out of hand: more than 70% of 
income was spent collectively, the government budget deficit was 11% of GDP and 
unemployment kept increasing. To get the economy back on track, this “no nonsense” 
coalition of Christian Democrats and Liberals adopted the motto “more market less 
government” and it outlined five “large operations”, including privatisation and deregulation 
programs, with the aim to reduce government expenditures, to make the public sector smaller 
and more flexible, to create more room for private initiative, and thereby foster economic 
growth. The second Lubbers cabinet (1986-1989) intensified this course; in its 1986 
government declaration it boldly stated: “all services that do not necessarily have to be 
performed by the government are candidates for privatisation.” Around that time, the Finance 
Minister, Ruding, formulated frameworks for how to decide which services should preferably 
be performed by the State and, with minor modifications, these guide policy until today. In 
Section 2, I will discuss these principles, how they were applied, and what the results have 
been. 
 
In 1989, Lubbers’ Christian Democratic Party formed a coalition government with 
Labour and privatisation became less prominent, with the interdepartmental committee on 
privatisation being abolished in 1992. In 1994, after a national debate on the challenges faced 
by the Dutch economy in a globalising world, it was, however, concluded that large-scale   6
deregulation of the economy was necessary and the first purple cabinet (a coalition of Labour 
with two liberal parties), headed by Wim Kok, revived the liberalisation and deregulation 
programs. Rather than focusing on privatisation, the microeconomic policies of this 
government stressed regulatory reform; “marktwerking” (making use of market forces) 
became a key term in policy discussions. What was lacking, however, was a clear view of 
what benefits competition could achieve and what government actions were needed to achieve 
more intense competition. At least initially, policy seemed to be based on the naïve ideas that 
competition would automatically take care of all the public interests at stake and that 
government policy could be limited to opening up and fully deregulating markets; see Van 
Damme (2001). While this policy worked reasonably well for the “easy” projects handled 
under Kok I (1994-1998), when the focus was mainly on increasing competition in the 
business sector, it became more problematic during Kok II (1998-2002), when the emphasis 
shifted to making use of market forces within the public sector and to the liberalisation of 
network industries. Around 1999, when it was clear that the results were not always 
satisfactory, high advisory councils started to criticise the government for not having 
formulated a consistent vision about how to proceed and for not having been thoughtful 
enough in the liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation processes. In response, the 
government formulated principles to guide policy making on liberalisation and privatisation 
of network industries, and these will be discussed in Section 3. 
 
In the Sections 4-6 of this paper I will then illustrate these principles by describing the 
developments and experiences in specific network sectors: post and telecommunications 
(Section 4), electricity and gas (Section 5), and public transport (Section 6). We will see that, 
even though policy documents consistently advocated the line “privatise when possible”, 
practise proved more stubborn and, frequently, restructuring involved both nationalisation as 
well as privatisation. The 1990s can best be described as a period of “muddling through” with 
privatisation and deregulation not always being successful and the public becoming 
increasingly sceptical about their benefits. The experiences have, however, led to the debate 
about proper institutional arrangements in network industries to be more informed about what 
the practical constraints are, about what is feasible, and to more realistic expectations. There 
is now a better view on the risks involved in privatisation and as a result policy now proceeds 
in a more cautious, pragmatic, way. As a result, the words “privatisation” and “use of market 
forces”, now no longer seem to have the same negative connotation as they had around the 





When, in 1982, the first Lubbers government came into office, it announced large-
scale programs of privatisation and deregulation, aimed at pushing back the role of the State. 
As the involvement of the State in the production of market goods was already limited (in the 
1970s, government controlled enterprises were responsible for only 3.6% of GDP, compared 
to about 10% in France, Germany and the UK; see Short (1984, p. 117), the focus of the 
privatisation program was on the reorganisation of government. The aim was threefold: to 
achieve budgetary savings and improve public finances, to reduce the size of the public sector 
and increase its efficiency, and to strengthen the private sector. It is important to note that 
selling shares in state owned enterprises (SOE’s) was formally not part of the privatisation 
program, but fell under a different policy line, that on state participations; see Kamerstukken 
(1985-1986). The motivation was that, since SOE’s were already operating in competitive 
markets, they were disciplined by market forces, so that a change in ownership would not lead 
to changes in behaviour or efficiency. As such asset sales fall under the international 
definition of “privatisation”, we will also consider them here (Section 2.2). First, however, we 
discuss those projects that fell under the formal Dutch program. 
 
2.1 Privatisation  à la Hollandaise
2  
 
The 1983 implementation plan of the Ministry of Finance (Kamerstukken, 1982-1983) 
adopted a broad definition of privatisation and distinguished between outsourcing of 
government services, corporatisation (a government unit is put at arm’s length, and becomes a 
separate legal entity, so that it can operate in a more businesslike fashion, less burdened by 
bureaucratic control) and real privatisation (transfer of asset ownership to private parties). The 
plan expressed a preference for contracting out and real privatisation, and viewed 
corporatisation as being second best, since this involved the government giving up control 
rights, without a corresponding reduction in financial risks. While corporatisation was viewed 
                                                 
1    Some other papers on this topic, all focusing on privatisation efforts of the Lubbers cabinets are 
Andeweg (1994), Boorsma (1984), De Ru and Van Aalst (1987), Haffner and Berden (1998), Hulsink 
and Schenk (1998) and Van de Ven (1994).  De Ru (1981) gives a very readable overview of the history 
of privatisation in the Netherlands up to 1982. 
2   The term is from Andeweg (1994)   8
as a first step towards “real privatisation”, it would turn out that most “privatisations” would 
not make it beyond this step, with all the associated consequences. 
 
The 1983 implementation plan already contained a list of 14 candidates for 
privatisation and when a first evaluation was made in 1988, 8 projects (of which 5 real 
privatisations) were finished, while 40 projects (of which 11 real privatisations) were 
scheduled to be finished before the end of the Lubbers II cabinet period in 1990; see 
Kamerstukken (1987-1988). In total slightly less than 120,000 employees were involved in 
these operations, but almost all of them (115,000) in corporatisation projects. Indeed the 
largest projects involved nothing more than transforming state enterprises (state firms that fall 
under public law) into state owned enterprises (SOE’s), i.e. firms that fall under private law 
but that are wholly owned by the State. Two of these, PTT in 1989 and Postbank in 1986, 
were responsible for 85% of the jobs involved. Both incorporation activities were a first step 
towards real privatisation, which would occur in the 1990s; see below. One other, smaller, 
state enterprise, the State Port Authority of IJmuiden, followed a similar track, the other two 
state enterprises were corporatised (the State Printing Office (SDU) in 1988, the State Mint in 
1994), but they are still 100% government owned at the moment. 
  
The smaller projects on the 1988 list form a mixed bag, including agencies with 
certification or standardisation tasks, or occupying monopoly positions. The organisation 
supplying pilotage services, services that are very important to bring large ships safely into 
the harbour of Rotterdam, was privatised already in 1983, without accompanying price 
regulation. The government soon suffered the consequences. The pilots were well aware of 
their bargaining power, and they quickly seized the opportunity to raise salaries; while before 
privatisation, the service was making a surplus of some € 10 million a year, after privatisation 
the government had to pay a similar amount on a yearly basis. This privatisation was heavily 
criticised by the Court of Auditors, see Algemene Rekenkamer (1989). The important 
distinction between privatisation in a competitive market context and privatisation in a 
monopoly environment would be made only later, during the Lubbers II cabinet, when it was 
argued that monopolies could not be privatised. It seems that the possibility of using 
regulation to discipline private monopolies was considered only around 1995; see below.
3  
 
                                                 
3   On June 22, 2004, the Ministry of Public Works announced that the monopoly would remain until 2019, 
but that there would be supervision by the competition authority NMa.   9
Even though the official privatisation program was stopped around 1990, after the 
Labour Party had entered the government, with the interdepartmental committee on 
privatisation being abolished in 1992, the process of giving more autonomy to government 
organisations has continued since then. The government report “Verantwoord 
Verzelfstandigen” (Kamerstukken 1994-1995a) contains recommendations about when and 
how government agencies could be “hived off” and what legal form would be most 
appropriate, but that report is non-economic in nature and does not take into account the 
warnings issued already at the start of the privatisation program. In many of these cases of 
“privatisation à la Hollandaise”, the second step of “real” privatisation did not follow: the 
process remained stuck half-way, after having created organisations, quango’s, that frequently 
neither face market discipline, nor effective administrative control. Not surprisingly, these 
organisations did not always function efficiently, or in the public interest, although evidence 
of that would frequently become available only much later. All this may explain why 
“privatisation” was not always successful, and has gotten a bad name. The netherworld of 
quangoland is not very transparent, but thanks to the efforts of the Netherlands Court of Audit 
the situation has much improved over the last couple of years; see the reports on “independent 
organisations with public tasks”, most recently Kamerstukken (2003-2004b). In June 2004, 
the Financieel Dagblad reported that a government committee had concluded that it would be 
better to bring all quango’s back within the government; see Financieel Dagblad (2004). 
 
2.2.  Real Privatisation  
 
Despite what was said in the Introduction, it should be noted that, in international 
comparison, asset sales in the Netherlands have not been negligible. As far as population is 
concerned, the Netherlands is about 
1/5-th of the size of Germany, and ¼-th of the size of 
France, Italy and the UK, and Dutch GDP is 1.7% of the OECD-total. Over the period 1990-
2001, privatisation proceeds in the Netherlands were $14.5 billion, which is 58% of the 
proceeds in Germany over the same period, 19% of those in France, 13% of those in Italy, 
34% of those of the UK, and 2.2% of those in the OECD. In the years 1994, 1995, and 2001, 
the Dutch share was above average: 6.7% and 7.3%, and 4% of those in the OECD; see 
OECD (2002).  
 
It is worthwhile to briefly describe the major privatisations since 1982. Already before 
1989, the State sold part of its shares in KLM and Hoogovens (a steel maker now part of   10
Corus) and divested some smaller companies, but with less than €250 million, proceeds were 
limited. Revenues were considerably higher in 1989, when the state reduced its stake in DSM 
(Dutch State Mines) to 31% by selling shares to the public for € 1.3 billion. In 1996, the 
remaining shares were sold for slightly less than € 0.8 billion. In 1990 Postbank was sold to 
ING Bank for € 0.6 billion in cash and a stake in ING, a stake that was successively reduced 
to zero by selling shares on the market in 1993, 1997 and 2002, total revenue being something 
like  € 0.75 billion, of which 80% was received in 1993. PTT was privatised in 1994 with the 
IPO yielding € 3 billion. One year later, a second batch of shares were sold with revenue in 
the same order of magnitude. In 1998, the company was split in a telecommunications 
company, KPN, and a postal company, TPG, which are both listed on the stock market, and to 
which we will return in Section 4. For now we note that, in 2001, the State reduced its stake in 
TPG to 35% (revenue € 0.9 billion) and that, in October 2002, the State reduced its share in 
KPN from 31.3% to 19.3%. By means of a share sale in 1997 that yielded € 0.75 billion, the 
stake in KLM was reduced from 38% to 14%, and in 2004 KLM merged with Air France. 
Worth mentioning are also, in 1998, the partial sale of the government computer centre, now 
PinkRoccade, yielding € 0.4 billion, and the partial sale in NIB Capital Bank in 1999 yielding 
almost € 1 billion.   
 
In the Netherlands, asset sales fall under the “policy with respect to state 
participations”, a policy line that can be summarized by “privatise when possible and 
financially sensible”. This line was formulated first in the 1985 report “Selling State 
Participations” (Kamerstukken, 1985-1986) that was prepared under the responsibility of the 
Minister of Finance, Ruding, and that was strongly influenced by the bad experience with 
active industrial policy in the Dutch shipbuilding industry during the 1960s and 1970s.
4 
Accordingly, this 1985 report takes as its starting point that a state participation in a business 
firm requires special justification and it proposes that the State portfolio be regularly 
evaluated. For each participation, the following questions should be addressed: Why was the 
participation taken? Has the aim been achieved? Are the original reasons still valid? Is 
participation still the best instrument to reach the goals? The report proposes that, if the goals 
can also be achieved by divesting the participation, such divestiture should be seriously 
considered and should be implemented when market conditions allow it. Only two specific 
                                                 
4   In the 1960s, the government had stepped in by providing subsidies to assist the shipbuilding sector to 
rationalise and create a national champion; the resulting company, RSV, however, was not viable and, 
in 1983, finally collapsed. A parliamentary investigation then revealed that more than one billion 
dollars had been wasted and concluded that industrial policy should not be conducted in this way.   11
instances are described where divestiture might not be a good idea: when the firm has a 
monopoly position, or when the state is (by far) the largest buyer of the firm. In short, the 
1985 memo states that state participations should be divested unless there are decisive reasons 
for not doing so. 
  
When the policy framework was revisited in 1997 (Kamerstukken 1996-1997c), it was 
concluded that the general principles formulated in 1985 still formed an excellent basis for 
future policy. In fact, the 1997 memo argues that the two exceptions to privatisation explicitly 
discussed in 1985 are no longer relevant. It is stated that monopolies, such as KPN, can be 
privatised: monopoly power can be countered by stimulating entry, or, in the case of 
insurmountable entry barriers, by regulating the firm. In case the State is the sole buyer, such 
as with the Royal State Mint, the relation with the firm can be a pure contractual one and 
privatisation is possible as well. Interestingly, when, in the parliamentary discussion, various 
MP’s asked about the consistency of this policy with that on privatisation more generally (i.e. 
the topic discussed in the previous subsection), and that with respect to hiving-off 
(corporatisation) in particular, the answer was that these were two different policy domains, 
and that different rules might apply. It was the Ministry of Economic Affairs that was 
responsible for that other policy and, at the time the Ministry of Finance was advocating 
“unconditional” privatisation, that Ministry seemed to move in the direction “liberalise first, 
then privatise”; see Section 3. 
 
  Policy with respect to state participations was most recently revisited in a memo from 
2001 (Kamerstukken 2001-2002a), which was discussed in parliament in December 2003 
(Kamerstukken 2003-2004a). That memo proposes to make a clear distinction between the 
State as shareholder and the State as guardian of the public interest, with the Ministry of 
Finance responsible for the first role, and a second line Ministry for the second. As the memo 
is written under the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance, it focuses mainly on the 
shareholder role of the State and, in this domain, there are few things to which one can object, 
although one can question the remark of the Minister of Finance that participations should 
yield the State a return on investment of some 3% above that on government bonds; see Zalm 
(2003). The memo argues that the policies with respect to state participations, corporatisation 
and the liberalisation of network industries are consistent with each other and it succinctly 
summarizes the overall policy line; the cabinet continues its course: state participations are 
temporary and    12
 
  “participations are divested if this is possible taking into account the public interests and the 
business interests of the state”. (Kamerstukken, 2001-2002a, p. 17) 
 
What is new, compared to the earlier memos from 1985 and 1997, is the explicit 
reference to the public interest. The explanation why the term appears is that, around 1999, 
two high advisory councils had criticized the government for not having taken the public 
interest sufficiently into account in its privatisation policies, an issue to which we will return 
in Section 3. What is not new is the preference for guarding the public interests by means of 
regulations and contracts, rather than by means of government ownership. This immediately 
raises a question: why doesn’t the government show more faith in public enterprises and in 
ownership as an instrument to safeguard the public interest? The 2001 memo contains (on the 
pages 10 and 11) a small section that addresses this issue, but we defer a discussion of it to 
Section 3. For now we note that the consistency in policy also throws up a puzzle: given that 
privatisation (possibly subject to regulation) is to be preferred, shouldn’t we have seen more 
privatisations? Why, during the last 25 years, has the Dutch State always participated in some 
40 firms, with many of these participations lasting for such a long time? A glance at the 2001 
list of State participations (see Appendix 1), shows that, next to companies (such as the 
publicly traded companies) that are on the divestiture path, the financial institutions and 
regional development companies (which serve as instruments to facilitate business and to 
attract investments and whose presence is in line with the general preference of the Dutch 
State to finance), and a mixed bag of firms associated with various forms of alleged market 
failure, all companies on the list are in network sectors.
5 The conclusion that we can draw is 
that, in network industries, the public interest may have prevented selling state participations. 
Why that might have been the case is discussed in the next section. 
 
3.  LIBERALISATION AND PRIVATISATION IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES  
  
The purple cabinet, consisting of Labour with two liberal parties, chaired by Wim 
Kok, which was formed after the 1994 elections stated, in its government declaration, that it 
wanted to modernize Dutch society, among others by engaging in processes of deregulation 
and liberalization. It stated three priorities for its microeconomic policy: regulatory reform 
                                                 
5   Note that the participations of lower level government are not included in this table. Municipalities and 
provinces own important assets such as the electricity distribution grids, and possible privatisation of 
these has been hotly debated; see Section 5.   13
(among others through the “MDW-program” (Kamerstukken, 1994-2004) that aimed at 
increasing competition throughout the economy), liberalisation of network industries, and 
modernization of the competition law, bringing it in line with the EU-prohibition system. The 
third track was completed in 1998 when the new competition law came into effect and when 
the competition authority (NMa) started operations. The two other tracks, of course, are 
related in that they both aim at increasing competition, either from a situation where 
competition is not very intense, or where it is absent. Both of these tracks would be continued 
under the second purple cabinet, Kok II (1994-1998), but with a shift in emphasis. While, 
during Kok I, the focus was on deregulation in the business sector, in Kok II the emphasis 
was more on the introduction of market mechanisms in the public sector and on liberalisation 
of network industries. This section describes the policy framework during the two purple 
cabinet periods, and the policies pursued, the emphasis being on network industries. 
 
3.1 Regulatory Reform without Design 
 
As I have argued in more detail elsewhere (Van Damme, 1996, 2001), the regulatory 
reform projects pursued under the purple cabinets seem to have been based, at least initially, 
on a somewhat naïve view of the market process. Policy proposals were based on the twin 
ideas that competition would automatically take care of the public interests involved and that 
opening up and deregulating markets would be sufficient to create a competitive market. In 
short, the view was that more competition was better and that “more competition” was 
equivalent to “fewer rules”, hence, there was little attention for market design issues and for 
managing the transition process. While, under Kok I, the resulting policy led to some 
successful projects, such as the liberalisation of shop opening hours, others, such as the 
reform of the taxi market, were outright failures, or were too ambitious, so that they never 
made it to the implementation phase. Of course, in network industries, establishing 
competition is even more difficult, and market design and transition management become 
even more important. For the latter, it is essential to have sector specific rules and a powerful 
independent regulator. Unfortunately, in line with the “less rules means more competition” 
view and Dutch political tradition, there has been a reluctance to impose such rules and to set 
up such regulators.  
 
In the Dutch administrative tradition, setting up regulators is seen as expansion of the 
government, with the independent agency not falling under full political control. It is accepted   14
to have supervisors, referees, that check whether businesses play according to the rules, 
however, the traditional view of administration argues that regulation is part of law making, 
hence, has to pass through parliament; see Kamerstukken (1994-1995b). Supervisors cannot 
make rules themselves; they cannot be regulators. For example, the law establishing the 
telecommunications “regulator” OPTA (Kamerstukken, 1996-1997a) clearly states that the 
Ministry is responsible for rule making, while OPTA has the power to apply the rules in 
specific cases. It is quite remarkable that it took till March 1999 before the government 
formulated its general “vision on supervision”, consisting of three main lines: aloofness with 
respect to sector specific competition rules, caution with respect to sector specific regulators 
and good coordination between different supervisors; see Kamerstukken (1998-1999a). From 
an economic point of view, one can question at least the first two principles. Indeed, OPTA 
has frequently complained that, as a result of the government not having delegated real 
regulatory powers to OPTA and the general rules being vague, it does not have enough power 
to optimally serve the public interest and it is not able to do its job properly. (For more on 
this, see Section 4). 
 
Given all this, it should not come as a surprise that, during the Kok II government, the 
liberalisation and reform projects came into difficulties. In essence, the low hanging fruit had 
been picked during the early years, now the more complicated problems had to be tackled. 
The government slowly learned that it had weak instruments, but more work to do. On top of 
that, ideological differences between the coalition parties started to show up, first in relation 
to a proposal for a new law on water supply; see Kamerstukken (1997-1998a, nr. 3). The first 
government proposal (Kamerstukken, 1997-1998a, nr. 1) simply argued, at a rather general 
level, that more competition was desirable as it would improve efficiency, but it did not 
advocate changes in ownership. With the exception of VVD (Liberals), all political parties, 
however, approved a motion that pointed out that the sector was delivering high quality water 
at a very reasonable price, that the sector objected strongly to the new plans, and that advised 
the government to drop the plans for introducing competition. Confronted with such 
opposition, the Kok II government backed out further. It stated that privatisation would give 
rise to cumbersome regulation and was undesirable, and it gave up its plans for legal 
separation between infrastructure and service provision: water would remain in public hands, 
but with the local public utilities being benchmarked against each other. Since then the 
situation in the water sector has remained unchanged. In the Summer of 1999, the conflict 
would come out in the open with two cabinet Ministers taking diametrically opposite   15
positions on the privatisation issue in two articles that appeared, on July 14, on the same page 
in the same newspaper, NRC. After the summer, during the general discussions at the opening 
of the new parliamentary year, Prime Minister Kok, was then forced to explain what the 
policy line of his cabinet was. As it turned out, he was forced in the defense by the advice of 
the “Raad van State” (the highest advisory council of the government) on the government’s 
plans for the year 2000. 
 
In this advice (and later again in its annual report on the year 1999), the “Raad van 
State” called attention for the fact that the desire to reach the government’s goals by means of 
market instruments and privatisation had not always yielded the results that were hoped for, it 
raised the question about what was the proper intellectual framework for thinking about these 
issues, and it asked to proceed further on the path of introducing competition only after a 
careful analysis of the pros and cons had been done.  Furthermore, the Council pointed to the 
drawbacks of privatising monopolies in network industries, such as high regulatory burdens 
associated with protecting consumer interests and it praised the government for its decision 
not to privatise the water companies; see Kamerstukken (1999-2000a) and Raad van State 
(2000). Obviously, it is quite remarkable that the call for reflection and careful analysis was 
made only after the policy had been in place for about 20 years. Remarkably, the “Raad van 
State” was not alone in making this plea. Half a year later, the “Wetenschappelijke Raad voor 
het Regeringsbeleid”, WRR, the highest scientific advisory board of the government went 
even further; it concluded that the decision to privatise had sometimes been made ill 
considerately and it called the entire policy in question; see WRR (2000). What is perhaps 
most remarkable is that the WRR-report on how to guard the public interest, while making 
strong claims, did not refer to the relevant international economic literature, even though that 
literature was highly relevant.  
 
Motivated by these critical reports, and taking into account dissatisfaction of the 
public with the results achieved thus far, as well as negative news from the UK (the October 5 
train accident outside Paddington station killing 31 people), the Labour Party changed its 
view on privatisation from the official “yes, subject to conditions”, to “no, unless”. As the 
other two coalition parties did not change their position, the overall government standpoint on 
privatisation was maintained at “yes, provided that certain conditions are satisfied”. The 
ideological conflict within the cabinet, in effect, led to policy making under Kok II coming to   16
a standstill, increasing the dissatisfaction of the voters, and this paved the way for the populist 
Pim Fortuyn Party to win, out of nothing, 25% of the votes in the 2002 elections.  
 
3.2 The Policy Framework 
 
As a result of the critical comments of the “Raad van State”, during the general 
political considerations in 1999, both chambers of parliament asked the government for an 
integral view on the policy of liberalization and privatisation. The government complied by 
providing two memos, one on guarding the public interests (Kamerstukken 2000-2001a), the 
other on liberalisation and privatisation in network industries (Kamerstukken 1999-2000b). In 
this subsection, I discuss the latter memo and show how it relates to the most recent memo on 
selling state participations (Kamerstukken 2001-2002ba), that was already mentioned in 
Section 2.2.  
 
The government memo “Liberalisation and Privatisation in Network Industries”, 
which is written under the responsibility of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, expresses a 
preference to guard the public interest by means of contracting and regulation with 
appropriate monitoring, but formulates policy in somewhat cautious terms. It proposes a 
pragmatic five-step procedure:  
(i)  Identify the public interests (universal service, security of supply, etc.), that have to be 
protected and for which government intervention may be necessary;  
(ii)  Translate these public interests into hard, verifiable constraints that have to be 
satisfied by the firms in the industry; 
(iii)  Set up an appropriate independent supervisory arrangement for checking whether 
contractual conditions and the public interests are met; 
(iv)  Investigate whether competition can help in reaching the public goals, and implement 
the appropriate market structure; 
(v)  Investigate whether privatisation is possible. 
 
It is worthwhile to briefly comment on these steps. First of all, the memo notes that 
several of these steps will be required (steps 1 and 2) or add value (steps 3 and 4) also in the 
case of public ownership and public provision. We see that, with respect to guarding the 
public interest, again little faith is displayed in public ownership as such, an issue to which we 
return below. In line with the “the fewer rules, the more competition” doctrine, the memo   17
stresses that restraint should be exercised in the creation of sector-specific competition rules 
and it expresses a preference for monitoring (ex post) above ex ante supervision. Relatedly, 
there is a preference to concentrate all regulatory powers with the NMa, the Dutch 
Competition Authority. With respect to competition, the memo rightly notes that the design 
has to be tailor-made, and it distinguishes between infrastructure-competition, service 
competition over one infrastructure, competition for the market, and yardstick competition, 
where the first mentioned are the most preferred. With respect to the ownership issue, the 
overall conclusion is that, in a competitive market, provided there is adequate supervision, 
privatisation can take place, while in markets in which there is not yet sufficient competition, 
privatisation is an option, but imposes more demands on the supervisory arrangements. In 
referring to Newbery (1997), the memo states that the first priority is to have an adequate 
market structure; the privatisation question can be answered only thereafter.  
 
Note that this conclusion is consistent with that of the most recent memo on state 
participations. One difference between these memos is that the one on networks devotes more 
attention to the limits involved in contractual and supervisory arrangements, while the one on 
participations stresses the drawbacks of ownership. Nevertheless, also the memo on networks, 
in essence, derives the preference for contractual relations and privatisation from the 
consideration that the alternative instrument of (partial) public ownership has drawbacks: 
having a firm in the hands of the government offers no automatic guarantee that the public 
interest will be met and it requires special contractual arrangements as well, especially since 
direct government influence on state participations will frequently be limited.  
 
The memo on state participations contains (on the pages 10 and 11) a small section 
that explains that the limited direct influence of the government on state participations mainly 
is the result of the Dutch legal regime for business firms. Consistent with the general 
preference to separate policy making from service provision and to induce efficient 
production, if the government provides market services itself, it will usually choose the 
organisational form of a limited liability company (NV). Now one should know that for NV’s, 
at least if they are of sufficient size, Dutch corporate law, the so-called “Structuurregime”, 
limits the influence of shareholders severely. In essence, the structural regime lays all power 
with the Supervisory Board of the company, the RVC, a body that refills itself by a system of 
cooptation and that is supposed to act in the interests of the firm, not those of any stakeholder 
in particular. Consequently, even if the government wanted to have influence on the   18
management of a government NV (which is not clear as this might jeopardise the efficiency 
goal) it will, hence, have limited direct influence. In other words, if additional goals are to be 
pursued, then these should be imposed on the firm by means of the firm’s statutes, or through 
regulatory or contractual obligations. 
 
More generally, in the choice between full privatisation and public provision by an 
SOE that has the legal form of an NV, the government has to gauge the strengths of the 
various instruments that are its disposal. Broadly speaking, the State can influence a state 
participation through four different channels: 
(i)  by means of regulation;  
(ii)  by writing specific duties in the firm’s corporate charter;  
(iii)  by the appointment of members to the Supervisory Board; 
(iv)  by exercising its rights as a shareholder. 
 
The first instrument is also available when dealing with private firms; hence, this is no 
argument for public provision. The second instrument is a weak one: statutory obligations 
cannot be written in great detail; the goals of the company will be described in general terms 
and cannot be easily adjusted to changing circumstances. Interestingly, the government has 
eliminated the possibility of using the third instrument. While in the past the State had the 
power to appoint certain members in the Supervisory Board, that policy has been 
discontinued, as it did not prove a very workable solution and since the State did not want to 
have special privileges for itself; see Kamerstukken 2000-2001b. Finally, if the 
“Structuurregime” applies, an ordinary shareholder has only limited powers to influence the 
company. Of course, the State might want to reserve for itself a golden share, giving it the 
right to veto important decisions or fundamental changes in the charter. The Dutch State has 
done this in the case of TPG (post) and KPN (telecommunications). The European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice have, however, argued that these golden 
shares limit capital mobility in Europe, hence, should be withdrawn; for example see ECJ 
(2003). In response, the State has indicated that it is willing to withdraw its golden share in 
KPN, but not in TPG. In the latter case, government ownership is said to be necessary to 
guarantee that TPG will keep out of financial trouble and be always able to offer universal 
postal services. The strength of this argument remains to be tested, but it would seem wise for 
the State to take into account the contingency that, in the near future, also this instrument can 
no longer be used.    19
 
It follows that, in the Netherlands, an SOE indeed is not a very attractive instrument to 
pursue the public interest. Nevertheless, this does not imply that it cannot be the best 
instrument and in this respect, the 2001 memo, on state participations is not convincing: while 
it describes the drawbacks involved in the State influencing SOE’s, it does not discuss the 
limits of contractual arrangements with private firms. As a result, the trade-offs involved are 
not made visible. As we will see in the Sections below, in practise the concern has come up 
that contractual relationships would not be sufficiently powerful to protect the public 
interests, and this has led to reluctance to fully privatise SOE’s and participations of lower 
levels of government. In some sectors, such as electricity, privatisation has been blocked, 
since the government was not sure that the conditions for regulation and monitoring were 
adequate, i.e. that the government had sufficiently powerful regulatory instruments to allow 
privatisation to take place. 
 
4.  POST AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
 
In August 1997, OPTA the Dutch regulator for post and telecommunications, started 
operations. OPTA states as its mission to stimulate effective competition in the markets for 
electronic communication and postal services and to protect consumers whenever these do not 
have sufficient choice. OPTA, however, has only weak instruments to realise its mission: it is 
not a “regulator”, its formal tasks are limited to monitoring whether players keep to the rules 
of the game and to resolve conflicts between market players. The Ministry is responsible for 
rule making, which OPTA has to apply in specific cases. As a result of the rules being vague, 
parties have ample opportunities to appeal to OPTA’s decisions on formal procedural 
grounds, on the argument that OPTA has overstepped its powers or has misinterpreted the 
rules.  While these court cases have delayed competition, we will see in this Section that, 
thanks to high level of expertise at the office, OPTA has made good contributions to make the 




Dutch liberalization policy has followed the steps of the EU-Directives, but 
implementation has been slow. The original European ONP-framework, aiming at fully 
liberalising telecommunications markets by January 1998 and at making the transition to a   20
competitive market, was implemented by means of the “Telecommunicatiewet” 
(Kamerstukken 1996-1997b), which came into effect only at the end of 1998. The new EU 
Telecommunications package (the set of Directives that the European Parliament and the 
Council agreed upon on February 14, 2002) should have been implemented by the summer of 
2003, but the new law (Kamerstukken 2003-2004c) came into effect only on May 19, 2004. 
Although law making is slow, competition has developed in most market segments.  
 
As was described in Section 2, the national PTT was incorporated in 1989, and 
privatised in 1993. In 1998, PTT was split into a telecommunications company, KPN, and the 
postal company TPG that we will discuss below, which are both listed on the stock exchange. 
Already in 1989, the separation was made between regulatory functions, which were left 
behind in the Ministry, and the provision of telephony services. The separation between rule 
making and market supervision was made in 1997 when OPTA was established, with full 
market liberalisation taking place shortly thereafter. Privatisation thus took place well before 
the market was liberalized. By now, the government has sold the majority of its shares in 
KPN. In October 2003, the State share was reduced from 31.3% to 19.3%, and the State is 
willing to sell more when the time is right. The State still has a golden share, but it has 
indicated that it is willing to give this up. In line with the general policy outlined above, now 
that the telecommunications market is viewed as “sufficiently mature”, the State views KPN 
as an ordinary investment, i.e. there are no special strategic interests involved. In response to 
the question why the State did not sell in better times, such as in 1999, the Minister of Finance 
has always answered that there was never a moment in which he did not have inside 
information, hence, that stock market regulations have prevented the State from selling 
earlier.   
 
In fact, there is no evidence that, as of 1993, the State has viewed the company any 
different from an ordinary investment; in any case, it has not prevented the company from 
getting into trouble. It allowed KPN to realise its ambitions to become a European player, 
among others by taking over E-plus in Germany, by taking a share in Hutchinson’s “3” in the 
UK, and by participating in UMTS auctions in the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium. After 
the 2000 telecoms crash, however, when KPN needed new money to write off on these 
investments and to pay the debts, the State participated in KPN’s new share issue and thus 
played an important role in preventing KPN from going bankrupt, although the State claims   21
that, in this respect, it did not behave differently from what any other large shareholder would 
have done.  
 
It is important to note that KPN has been privatised with the fixed network included. 
Clearly, the fixed network is an important asset on KPN’s balance sheet and, as company data 
(available at www.KPN.com) show, the company receives a steady stream of income from its 
fixed telephony business, although that revenue has started to decline recently; see below. 
Since 2000, a discussion has taken place about whether privatising KPN as an integrated 
company, i.e. including the fixed network, was a wise decision. Two drawbacks have been 
mentioned: privatising KPN as an integrated company might have jeopardised the public 
interest of uninterrupted telephony service and it may have delayed competition in some 
market segments.  
 
The first point was discussed for a first time when KPNQwest, a participation of KPN 
active in the broadband backbone market, went bankrupt in 2002. Although Internet traffic 
was uninterrupted, the question arose what would happen with voice telephony if KPN itself 
would go under. According to OPTA, there could be severe problems in that case, as the 
bankruptcy administrator would have to take into account the interests of the debt holders 
only, hence, he could choose to neglect the public interest. The government always took the 
view that things were not so serious, but on March 12, 2004, it announced that it had decided 
to arrange for a special fund out of which the administrator could draw in case of severe 
calamities, so as to guarantee uninterrupted service also in this case. We can infer that the 
risks involved in privatisation of firms possessing essential assets, in the past, may indeed 
have been underestimated. 
 
Moving to the second drawback, in some market segments, such as fixed voice 
telephony, privatising KPN as an integrated company probably indeed may have delayed 
competition somewhat. The local loop of the network is traditionally considered an essential 
facility that cannot be economically duplicated by entrants; hence, KPN should give entrants 
access at non-discriminatory terms. Clearly, the fact that KPN is both service provider and 
network owner gives it an incentive to raise rivals’ costs and this creates difficulties for the 
regulator, OPTA. Since several key terms in the law and powers of OPTA have been unclear, 
there have been many legal disputes in this area. Nevertheless, OPTA has taken a tough 
stance, for example, by imposing price squeeze tests on KPN, that force the company to leave   22
some margin between its retail and wholesale tariffs and that allow CPS-operators (carrier 
select) to compete. (See Bouckaert and Verboven (2004) for description and economic 
analysis of price squeeze tests.) As a result, competition has developed also in this market. At 
the time of writing, about a third of the users of the fixed network are using CPS-services, 
and, for a typical consumer, it is still possible to have cost savings of 15% when switching to 
a CPS-provider. As OPTA (2004) shows, in most market segments, KPN’s market share is 
now smaller than that of incumbents in other EU-countries, with the share in international 
traffic (45-50%) being low in particular. In international perspective, fixed voice telephony in 
the Netherlands is cheap, as Table 4.1 shows. It should be noted, however, that since 2001 
KPN’s prices have increased by 9% and that, over 2002, prices of CPS-providers have 
increased by 7%.  
 
  Local National To US To a neighbouring country 
The Netherlands  0.33  0.49  0.85  0.85 
Sweden 0.30  0.30  1.12  0.59 
Germany 0.42  1.22  1.23  1.23 
Spain 0.28  0.88  1.53 1.53 
Italy 0.25  1.22  2.12  2.12 
France 0.39  0.96  2.34  2.34 
United Kingdom  0.64  1.29  3.37  4.06 
Table 4.1: International comparison of cost (Euro) of fixed telephony 
 for a 10-minute call. (Source OPTA (2004)). 
 
  The Dutch government has always stressed that full infrastructure competition is to be 
preferred above service competition over one network. Fortunately, in important market 
segments, such as broadband Internet access, infrastructure competition is possible since 98%, 
of Dutch houses is connected to both the telephony and the cable-TV-network. To make such 
competition possible, KPN has been forced to sell its (considerable) interests in cable early 
on. At the same time, the municipalities, the traditional owners of other cable networks did 
not have the expertise, money, or interest, to upgrade their networks. In the 1990s, in a 
situation with eager buyers, they were interested in selling and the government did not oppose 
privatisation in this domain. As a result UPC (a daughter company of UGC Europe inc., see 
www.ugceurope.com) was able to buy many networks and, at present, it is the largest cable   23
operator in the Netherlands. The big 3 cable operators (UPC, Casema (currently owned by the 
investment companies Carlyle and Providence from the UK), and Essent, a Dutch multi-
utility) together have 85% of all connections. While privatisation of cable has not been 
without problems (with several firms having been accused of abusing their dominant position 
in the TV market), the competing infrastructure has proved very beneficial for broadband 
Internet access. OPTA, in forcing KPN to unbundle its local loop, resulting in the Netherlands 
having (together with Denmark and Sweden) the largest percentage of unbundled lines being 
in the hands of entrants, provided an additional boost to competition. As a result there is 
strong competition between various xDSL-providers and between xDSL and cable with price 
decreasing rapidly. (Many ISP’s halved prices and doubled speed in 2003.) In May 2004, 
OPTA reported there were 1.1 million xDSL connections (and 1 million broadband cable 
connections, this resulting in a large penetration in European perspective. At the same time, 
KPN reported that it had over 0.9 million connections, hence KPN’s share in the xDSL-
market is around 80%, while it is 42% in the overall broadband market. 
 
As far as mobile telephony is concerned, since the 1998 DCS-1800 auction, the Dutch 
market has five license holders with full networks, and since then several additional service 
providers (virtual operators) have become active as well. While the fact that there were 
already five operators led to relatively low revenue for the government in the 2000 UMTS-
auction, there is the important benefit of the Dutch mobile market probably being one of the 
more competitive in Europe. Table 4.2, taken from OPTA (2004) shows that, in the 
Netherlands, mobile telephony is cheap indeed. Not surprisingly then, the penetration rate is 
above 80% of the population, there being more than 13 million active connections.   24
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003
Finland  140 159 157 146 
The  Netherlands 252 291 252 229 
Sweden  165 204 213 255 
Germany  329 338 309 323 
Italy  303 367 356 343 
United  Kingdom 309 337 319 355 
United  States  396 343 409 409 
Australia  369 285 293 419 
France  382 420 395 468 
Table 4.2: International comparison of mobile telephony tariffs, 
     annual expenditures (2000-2003) of a residential client in 
     US$ against purchasing power parity. 
     (Source OPTA (2004)). 
 
  This is not to say that there are no problems in the mobile market. Just as in other 
countries with the CPP-system (calling party pays), there is the issue of high mobile 
terminating tariffs, i.e. an operator needs to pay a high price to a competitor for terminating a 
call on the latter’s network. This translates into higher retail tariffs, with fixed to mobile calls 
being particularly expensive. Indeed, and perhaps caused precisely by the intensive 
competition on the mobile market, terminating tariffs have been especially high in the 
Netherlands. In 2003, they were 22 Eurocents per minute, only slightly less than those in 
Portugal, the most expensive European country. OPTA has been worried about this for a long 
time and, together with NMa, it has threatened to intervene on the basis of the competition 
law, claiming prices to be excessive. As a result, in 2003 mobile operators agreed to halve 
their terminating rates in two years. As of April 2004, the terminating rate is 16 €c/m, it will 
be 14 €c/m by the end of the year and 12 €c/m in December 2005, which is the lowest rate 
that is currently available in Europe. 
 
All in all, consumers are satisfied with the way the Dutch telecommunications market 
works. There is active competition and convergence between infrastructures. The outlook is 
that broadband penetration will increase further and that there will be a shift from fixed voice   25
telephony to mobile. As the fixed telephony tariffs have been rebalanced already since the end 
of the 1990s, the fixed subscription rate is relatively high and for almost 20% of the fixed 
callers it is now more than 75% of the bill. As a result and since subscription fees for mobile 
are much lower, already 7% of consumers have terminated their fixed line subscription, and it 
is predicted that another 20% of consumers will do that before long. The result, of course, will 
be higher subscription fees for the remaining callers on the fixed network, inducing some 
more of them to leave, which raises concerns for the future. In any case, OPTA (2004) 
concludes that there is healthy infrastructure competition and that the local loop of the fixed 
network no longer seems to be an essential facility. 
 
4.2.  The postal sector 
 
  In January 2004, the Minister of Economic Affairs published his most recent “vision 
on the postal market” (Kamerstukken 2003-2004e) in which he outlines his plans until 2007. 
Taking this memo as our starting point, this subsection briefly describes the current state of 
affairs in the postal market. 
 
Traditionally, the main consideration underlying the legislation of this market is that 
universal service must be guaranteed: letters and some other items have to be collected and 
delivered everywhere within the country six days a week at a geographically uniform tariff, 
with a certain percentage being delivered overnight; in addition, a certain number of outlets 
(post offices) have to be operated. TPG, the postal arm of the former PTT that was split off 
from KPN in 1998 and that is listed on the stock market, with the Dutch government holding 
34.7% of the shares, carries the universal service obligation. To allow the company to fulfil its 
obligations, it has been given a monopoly on the transport of letters up to 100 grams costing 
no more than 3 times the base rate (3 × € 0.39), as well as on some other services. European 
liberalization of the postal sector consists in gradual reduction of the reserved sector: from 
100 grams since January 2003 to 50 grams from January 2006, with the intention being to 
fully liberalise the market as of 2009; see the new Postal Directive 2002/39/EC. In the 
Netherlands, direct mail (non-personalised advertisement letters) does not fall in the reserved 
segment, so that the monopoly is smaller than in neighbouring countries and narrower than 
what Directive 2002/39/EC allows. Of all letter mail, only 48% is reserved, which compares 
to 59% in the UK, 68% in Germany and 82% in France. The “vision” document proposes to 
stay ahead of the European average, but, in the interest of TPG and its workers, to maintain a   26
level playing field with Germany and UK, hence, it is proposed to fully liberalise the market 
in 2007. Note that the government is trading off multiple goals: one would expect a faster 
pace to be better for (large) consumers.  
 
Even if a relatively large part of the market is already open to competition, and the 
incumbents from neighbouring countries (Deutsche Post, La Poste, Consignia), as well as 
several small players, are active on the Dutch market, TPG still has a dominant position on 
most market segments. Experience in countries, such as Finland and Sweden that are further 
down the liberalization path, has shown that competition will develop only slowly, if at all. 
The question is whether, in accomplishing the transition to a more competitive market, 
entrants should be given the right to make use of TPG’s facilities at regulated terms; if so, to 
which facilities or services and at what price? OPTA has argued that TPG should offer “an 
access menu” and that, at least temporarily, access to TPG’s sorting facilities and distribution 
network should be mandatory at regulated rates. On the basis of several studies (SEO (2003), 
De Bijl et al (2003)), the Minister has concluded that, even though the market has some 
natural monopoly segments, negotiated access should be sufficient.  At present, competitors 
to TPG, such as Sandd, are successfully rolling out their own networks; hence, full 
infrastructure competition indeed seems to be developing. Since such competition is to be 
preferred above service competition, the “hands-off” approach of the government may very 
well be justified.  
 
Another important issue on which OPTA has come to a different conclusion than the 
Ministry concerns tariff regulation. In the past, the price of a stamp was allowed to rise with 
the general rise in the wage level, i.e. there was price cap regulation with no adjustment for 
efficiencies. OPTA has argued that, while this system has given TPG strong incentives to cut 
cost and to improve efficiency, consumers have benefited insufficiently. While, in 
international comparison, sending a letter of up to 20 grams is cheap in the Netherlands, 
heavier mail is relatively expensive; see OPTA (2004, Figure 6). OPTA argues that, after 
correcting for population density, Dutch tariffs are not low, that TPG is making excess profits 
on the reserved segment and it has proposed to reduce the price by some 25%; see OPTA 
(2002). The Minister has refused to reduce the price, he has decided, as a sort of compromise, 
that the price of a stamp will remain fixed at € 0.39 until 2005, and in the “vision document”, 
he proposes to extend this period until 2007. This proposal not only makes OPTA unhappy, 
TPG has argued that, since the postal volume is decreasing (with some 20% up to 2040) and   27
there are economies of scale, unit cost are rising, hence, the company should be allowed to 
increase its prices. TPG appealed the decision and won: the Minister was forced to withdraw 
its decision. Nevertheless, in June 2004, TPG announced that it will not increase the base 
prices until 2007. Note that also here OPTA has no regulatory powers.  
 
  In its “vision document”, the government argues that the public interest requires that 
universal service be maintained, and that a fully liberalised market will deliver a level of 
service that falls short of what is desired: “single item mail” (small volume mail that is put in 
posting-boxes, a segment which is less than 10% of the market), is not very attractive for 
competitors, so that a duty to carry such mail should be assigned to TPG.  As TPG falls under 
the Dutch “structuurregime”, direct influence of the State on TPG is, however, limited, and to 
protect its interests, the State has a golden share in TPG that gives a veto right concerning 
certain key decisions. The government has argued that, at least for the moment, it needs to 
maintain this golden share in order to ensure universal service and that this instrument is 
proportional for this purpose, but there is discussion with the EC about the issue. The Dutch 
government argues that, in a liberalized postal market, without the golden share, TPG might 
get into financial trouble, jeopardising universal service. It remains to be seen how strong this 
argument is. 
 
In international comparison, the Dutch postal market is functioning efficiently: TPG, 
which in effect has operated as a regulated private profit-maximizing firm for the last decade, 
is an efficient firm, making healthy profits; quality of service is high, prices are reasonable 
and are declining in real terms; competition is developing in certain market segments and 
overall satisfaction with how the market operates is good. What explains the success is 
probably the fact that this market is relatively simple: there are only artificial and strategic 
barriers to competition, no natural ones; the government has been willing to open the market 




  DTe, the Dutch “regulator” for energy markets, was established through the Electricity 
Law 1998 (Kamerstukken 1997-1998b) that implemented Directive 96/92EC. Noteworthy is 
that the explanatory memorandum to this law expresses regret at yet another “independent 
supervisor”; it should therefore not be too surprising that DTe is set up as a chamber of the   28
NMa, the Dutch competition authority. At first, DTe had responsibilities only for supervising 
the electricity market, but after the Gas Law came into effect in 2001 (Kamerstukken 1998-
2000), DTe got formal powers also in that domain. In the Spring of 2004, parliament 
discussed the implementation law (Kamerstukken 2003-2004d) for the second EU Electricity 
Directive (2003/54/EC) and the second EU Gas Directive (2003/55/EC). At the moment of 
writing, the new law has already passed the second chamber of parliament; it will be 
discussed by the first chamber before the 1
st of July and put into effect soon thereafter. As a 
result of this new law, (among others) the independence of network management will be 
strengthened, there will be a clear separation between policy making (the responsibility of the 
Ministry) and supervision (the task of DTe), and there will be regulated access also to gas 
networks. In this section, we will discuss liberalisation of, and privatisation in the Dutch 




The electricity sector has been restructured in line with the two EU-Directives, but, as 
was the case with post, Dutch policy has been ahead of the European average. The 
government memo “Stroomlijnen” that was published in 1996 anticipated the EU electricity 
market liberalisation Directive 96/92/EC and outlined the essentials of the “Electricity Law 
1998”. At the time that document was published, municipalities and provinces, directly or 
indirectly, owned all players in the Dutch electricity sector. There were 4 large-scale 
producers (responsible for some 80% of supply) and 23 local distribution companies. Large-
scale generation was centrally coordinated by SEP, a cooperative joint venture of these 
producers. In addition to imports, domestic production involved small-scale self-generation 
by industrial units and distribution companies. In line with Directive 96/92/EC, the Electricity 
Law proposed gradual liberalisation of demand and stressed the importance of non-
discriminatory access to the transport and distribution networks. Below we describe the 
developments in the various market segments (production, transport, distribution and supply) 
since the 1998 law was passed.  
 
With respect to generation, the (draft) 1998 law was based on the idea of creating a 
“national champion”, by merging the four large-scale producers and with the government 
facilitating the merger by providing subsidies for stranded assets. In the spring of 1998, 
however, the producers could not agree on how to share the remaining costs, and the merger   29
plans were abolished. Subsequently, during 1999, foreign energy companies (Electrabel, E.On 
and Reliant) bought three of these generation companies, while the fourth generator remained 
in the hands of Essent, a vertically integrated energy company. In the generation segment, the 
law did not impose any sector specific restrictions on asset sales; if anything, privatisation 
was encouraged, the only constraints being that buyers had to commit to honour the 
obligations with respect to stranded assets and not to exert any influence on the national grid 
company TenneT (see below). Indeed, based on the idea that efficient scale in generation is 
relatively small and that the wholesale market would be competitive, the production sector 
has been left unregulated since 1999, hence, only the general competition and environmental 
laws apply.  
 
Since 2001, after the expiration of a transition period, needed to unwind the 
cooperative SEP agreement that blocked competition between domestic generators, generators 
have competed for the liberalised market segment. As domestic competition is gas based, 
there is room for cheap imports and indeed 15% of total supply is imported. Various market 
places facilitate competition. In addition to the somewhat informal OTC-market, the APX 
(see  www.apx.nl) has offered a daily spot market since May 1999. At the borders with 
Belgium and Germany, the import capacity is auctioned, so as to ensure efficient use of this 
capacity; see www.tso-auction.org. As a result of these organised markets, the Dutch 
electricity market is reasonably transparent. In retrospect, the possibilities for exerting market 
power on the wholesale market might have been underestimated at the time the law was 
drafted, and there might have been insufficient awareness of the potential pitfalls involved. 
After the California crisis, it has been discussed whether, to guarantee the public interest, 
some type of licensing of generation would not be desirable. In any case, the wholesale 
market is monitored closely: the DTe has set up a Market Surveillance Committee, in which 
several academics are active.  
 
In 2003, after having been active on the generation market for less than 4 years, 
Reliant has left the country again, with Nuon, a large integrated energy company, buying its 
assets. With this merger creating a market structure with two large vertically integrated 
energy companies, and wholesale markets that are not very liquid, the NMa was concerned 
that this is another step on the road to a tight oligopoly with three or four integrated players.  
It decided that the concentration can be allowed provided that 900 MW of capacity is divested 
by means of a VPP-auction (NMa, 2003), a decision that Nuon has appealed. Very recently, a   30
court decided that Nuon indeed will have to divest 900 MW, but that the requirement imposed 
by NMa, that the capacity contracts should be long-term (i.e. 5 years), should not be 
implemented at the moment. The NMa-decision is noteworthy as it stresses that, in 
delineating the relevant market, the time dimension is important: when the market is tight, 
players (even those with small market shares) may have substantial market power.  
 
  The requirements of non-discrimination and accounting separation imposed by 
Directive 96/92/EC were implemented by insisting on legal unbundling between production, 
network services and supply, as well as by certain other procedural safeguards. Consequently, 
the 1998 Dutch Electricity Law goes much further than what the First Directive demands; in 
fact, most of the requirements of the second Electricity Directive (2003/54/EC), that should 
be implemented by July 2004, are already met by that Law. The 1998 Law forces the 
economic owners of the networks to appoint independent network managers, with the 
appointment to be approved by the Minister. In what is probably best seen as an attempt to 
block network investments that could be used to expand imports, hence, increase competition, 
SEP, the joint venture of the generating companies that owned the transport grid, at first 
refused to delegate important investment decisions to the national transport grid manager, 
TenneT. As a result, it took until 2000 before the Minister could approve the appointment of 
TenneT. When dealing with this issue, the question came up whether government ownership 
would be necessary to ensure non-discriminatory access to the transmission grid. The original 
law was based on the idea that, to guarantee independence of the network company, it would 
be sufficient for the State to temporarily acquire the majority (50% plus 1) of the shares: after 
the transition period, full privatisation could take place. However, during the summer of 1999, 
the Christian Democrats changed their position on the privatisation issue to conclude that all 
essential grids, hence, also the national transport grid, should be owned by the State. Over 
time, other parties, with the exception of the Liberal Party, also came to adopt this position. In 
October 2001, the State fully acquired TenneT as well as Saranne BV, the legal owner of the 
grid, with the State paying slightly over € 1 billion. Interestingly, the 2001 government memo 
on state participations expresses some regret that Parliament forced the cabinet to make this 
acquisition; one can see a clear reluctance of the Ministry of Finance to take the ownership 
role, or maybe it just regrets having had to pay € 1 billion. With the Christian Democrats 
being in the government at the moment, it is unlikely that the State will soon sell any of its 
shares in the national grid, or in the systems operator TenneT. 
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  Since then, there have been further interesting developments with respect to the 
national grid manager and system operator TenneT. In 2003, TenneT bought a lower voltage 
grid that also has a transport function. In May 2001, TenneT bought the power exchange 
APX, the day ahead spot market on which approximately 15% of all energy consumed in the 
Netherlands is traded. In turn, in 2003, the APX bought APX (UK), a UK spot market for 
electricity. In June 2004, TenneT bought an auction house on which long-term energy 
contracts are traded (2.3 TWh in 2003). While it does make sense for TenneT to operate the 
APX (as, in its capacity of system operator, it also operates a balancing market, which can be 
used for last minute adjustment), it is less clear or what is the driving force behind the other 
acquisitions, in particular the foreign expansion. The DTe has published a consultation 
document on how TenneT should be regulated. 
 
The demand side of the market is liberalized in four steps, and liberalisation proceeds 
at a faster pace than the Second Electricity Directive (2003/54/EC) requires. Large users, 
representing about 1/3
rd of demand, were given freedom of supplier in 1999 and the middle 
group, again representing about one-third of demand, in January 2002. Immediately after 
liberalisation, some 30% of the middle segment switched supplier, and it turned out that the 
sector was not very well prepared for this. In July 2001, the market for green electricity was 
opened for all consumers, and the entire market will be open as of July 2004 when supply will 
be unregulated. As a result of relatively generous subsidies, a large number of small 
consumers (about 1 in 3 at the moment) are consuming green energy; see www.green-
prices.com, where one also sees that there are a large number of suppliers of such energy, that 
the market is transparent and that there is still considerable price dispersion. For further 
discussion on the green market, I refer to Van Damme and Zwart (2003), where it is also 
argued that the subsidies have largely been ineffective. At present, it is predicted that the full 
liberalisation as of July 1, 2004 will not lead to much switching; hence, one may infer that, 
just as in the UK (see Waddams Price, 2004), retail competition will probably not be very 
effective. 
  
DTe regulates distribution rates and, in setting the network charges, DTe is making 
use of yardstick competition, hence, network charges of different distribution companies are 
compared to each other and inefficient companies are forced to reduce their charges more 
than others. While in the first regulation period (2001-2003) there was regulation only on 
price, in the second period (2004-2006), network quality will be regulated as well. DTe   32
claims that, as a result of regulation, in the period 2001-2006 network tariffs decrease by 17% 
on average, leading to cost savings of come € 1.9 billion in total; see NMa (2004, p. 62).  
 
Article 93 of the 1998 Electricity Law states that privatisation of distribution 
companies is possible, subject to Ministerial approval. Since 1999, there has been a heated 
political discussion on the conditions under which such privatisation could take place, while 
at the same time a few distribution companies have been sold to German utilities. Each time 
this happened, the responsible Minister (Jorritsma, Liberals) applauded the developments, but 
parliament objected, tried to block the sale and, failing to do so, forced the Minister to impose 
stricter rules on privatisation. As a result, the cabinet has proposed guidelines (Staatscourant 
2001) and a draft law on “Privatisation of Energy Distribution Companies” (Kamerstukken, 
2001-2002c) that would allow privatisation, provided it was guaranteed that the network 
manager could and would operate in a way “sufficiently independent” from the rest of the 
company. Both of these were very complex and did not meet with any enthusiasm. When in 
2002, before the privatisation law could be discussed, another distribution company was 
bought by RWE, parliament was so upset with the fact that it could not block this 
privatisation that it forced the Minister to withdraw both the guidelines and the draft law. 
After the 2002 elections, the new Minister indeed withdrew both, while announcing that he 
would not allow any further privatisations until the market would be fully liberalised. Since 
that time, the deadline has been shifted further in the future. 
 
At issue in this discussion is first of all the question of what can be privatised: the 
vertically integrated company or the distribution network, or just the supply business? The 
current owners of the companies (local municipalities and provinces) are in favour of full 
privatisation: they argue that government regulation is sufficient to guard the public interests, 
that they have no real powers to influence the decisions of the distribution companies in any 
case (this again as a consequence of the Structuurregime) and that they have good use for the 
money that privatisation would bring. At the same time, it has been argued that there are 
several risks involved in full privatisation and that regulation might not be sufficiently 
powerful to deal with these. The main concern is that an integrated (private) company would 
have an incentive to discriminate against competing supply companies, hence, that it would 
frustrate supply competition. Other concerns are that it could use revenues from the network 
business to cross subsidise its supply business (again leading to “unfair competition”), and it   33
might underinvest in the network, with the State not having powerful legal means to intervene 
in case of mismanagement. 
 
One way of dealing with these concerns is to insist on unbundling of supply and 
distribution and indeed, to guarantee non-discriminatory access to the grids, the 1998 Law 
already forces distribution companies to legally unbundle their distribution networks from 
their supply business. In other words, the 1998 Law already implements an important 
requirement that, at the EU level, is imposed only by the second Electricity Directive 
(2003/54/EC). Even though the Law contains some other safeguards that are supposed to 
guarantee that the network manager operates in a way “sufficiently independent” from the rest 
of the company, there has been some concern, that network companies have not been able to 
do this. For example, when one pure supply company, Energy XS, went bankrupt in 2003, 
each network company switched the consumers of Energy XS to its sister supply company. 
The 2004 Law implementing the second EU Directive, therefore, imposes even stronger 
independence requirements, such as that the network company should be the owner of the 
grid.  
 
  Very recently the Minister has argued that even these additional measures might not 
be going far enough, hence, he has argued that full privatisation of the integrated company 
poses too great risks and that legal unbundling between distribution and supply is insufficient 
to deal with the concerns. The current proposal (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2004), hence, 
entails full (ownership) unbundling of the distribution company from supply and generation; 
it is thus proposed to fully separate the competitive parts of the value chain from the 
monopolistic elements. Such unbundling would have to take effect before 2007, where the 
non-network part of the company is allowed to be privatised immediately after the unbundling 
has taken place. The Minister argues that this plan offers the best of all worlds: generation and 
supply can remain together, hence, allowing companies economies of scale and scope, while 
separation will effectively deal with the anti-competitive concerns. He also argues that full 
structural separation does not destroy any value, hence, that current owners should be happy 
as well. The vast majority of parliament supports these plans, but current owners have not yet 
been convinced. In part this is because the Minister has not yet made up his mind on the 
privatisation of the network companies; it is clear that, in the future, they cannot be sold to 
firms that are also active in supply or generation (i.e. line of business restrictions will remain 
in place), but it is not clear whether they can be sold at all. We thus see a major change in   34
policy: while five years ago privatisation of distribution companies was considered to be 
unproblematic, it is now judged to be impossible.  
 
5.2.  Natural gas  
 
In 1997, the government published the white paper “Gasstromen” that anticipated EU 
Directive 98/30/EC and that outlined the essentials of a new Gas Law. With this Gas Law, 
(Kamerstukken 1998-2000) which was approved by parliament in 2000, for the first time 
rules for transport and supply of gas were introduced in the Netherlands; up to that time, there 
were only rules relating to production. The Law formulates uninterrupted supply of natural 
gas and optimal exploitation of Dutch natural gas resources as the public interests involved. 
The latter is the main difference with any of the other network sectors discussed in this paper: 
in a public private partnership with ExxonMobil and Shell, the Dutch State is an important 
producer of natural gas and Gasunie, the “national monopolist” is the largest player on the 
European gas market, with a market share of 17% in 2000. Given that natural gas is an 
important source of revenue for the Dutch State (during the last decade, annual revenue from 
gas has been 1.2% of GDP on average), it is not too surprising that the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Law explicitly refers to industrial policy and states that Gasunie should 
be well positioned in Europe. To put this in comparison, while in the period 1990-2001, 
Dutch privatisation proceeds were $ 14.5 billion, gas revenue was over € 47 billion. 
According to estimates of the National Audit Office, as a result of liberalisation, State revenue 
might decrease considerably (with up to €1 billion a year); see Kamerstukken (1999-2000d). 
It should, therefore, not be too surprising that Dutch liberalisation policy in gas is somewhat 
different from and less ambitious than, that in electricity. What is perhaps more surprising is 
that the Netherlands is not dragging its feet more. Indeed, the most recent change in law by 
means of which the second EU Gas Directive (2003/55/EC) is implemented insists on 
regulated access to the gas network, hence, it does away with the asymmetry that existed 
between gas and electricity; see Kamerstukken 2003-2004d. 
 
Gasunie is the central player in the “Dutch gas building”: it coordinates production 
and sales and is itself responsible for purchasing, storage, transport and sales. It is a public 
private partnership in which the State participates for 50% and ExxonMobil and Shell each 
for 25%. It was set up around 1960 to allow for optimal exploitation of the gigantic 
Slochteren gas field that was then discovered by NAM, a joint venture of Exxon (50%) and   35
Shell (50%). At that time, NAM was the only party licensed to search for oil and gas in the 
Netherlands and its license stipulated that it had to sell to the State, for a reasonable price, all 
gas that was found. The State on its part operated a transport network, among others to 
transport cokes oven gas from Germany to several Dutch cities. Upon discovering the large 
volume of natural gas, the parties joined forces. For gas production and the management of 
the Slochteren field, they set up the Maatschap Groningen, a joint venture of the State (40%) 
and NAM (60%). For transport and trade, Gasunie was set up. It was given a (regulated) 
double monopoly position, both on it input market (with respect to NAM and the Maatschap 
Groningen) as well as on the domestic output market, and it was assigned the task to develop 
the gas market in the Netherlands. The Minister of Economic Affairs was given powers to 
intervene: approving tariffs, monitoring supply, and possibly assigning special privileges to 
certain industrial sectors (think of greenhouses). During the 1960s an extensive network was 
rolled out quickly and by the end of that decade 99% of the Dutch households was connected 
to the “public” network.  
 
Dutch natural gas policy has always been based on the assumption that natural gas is 
scarce as well as on the idea that taxing at the production stage maximizes government 
revenue. Specifically, policy has consisted in providing incentives to exploit smaller fields 
first and to maintain the Slochteren field as much as possible: the “small fields policy”. To 
make exploration and exploitation attractive, Gasunie has been forced to pay all producers of 
Dutch gas a reasonable price, related to the “market value” of gas, the latter being the 
opportunity cost of the final gas consumer. If a small field producer sells its gas to Gasunie, it 
receives a price related to the (average) retail price over the previous calendar year. 
Consequently, Gasunie makes little profit itself; the profits are transferred to the producers, 
which are then heavily taxed. In essence, producers pay a profit tax to the State, the rate being 
somewhere between 50% and 99%, with the State getting some 70% of the profit on average, 
and 70% - 90% on the Slochteren field. Note that it is not obvious that the small fields policy 
is consistent with maximising government revenue: as Slochteren has much lower production 
costs than other fields (0.5 €c versus 2-3 €c; see Correlje and Odell (2000)), that field yields 
highest revenues. In defence, the government, points to the balancing function of the 
Slochteren field; in essence, production cost of the small fields are smaller as long as the large 
field is filled sufficiently.  
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The first EU Gas Directive 98/30/EC proposes gradual liberalisation of the gas 
market, with non-discriminatory access to the grids being an important requisite for 
competition to develop. The Directive is satisfied with accounting unbundling of integrated 
gas companies and negotiated third party access, with an independent authority resolving 
conflicts. In line with the Directive, the Gas Law imposes on Gasunie accounting separation 
between storage, transport and supply activities. Like the Directive, the Gas Law is satisfied 
with negotiated access to the grids, and it appoints DTe as the agency to deal with conflicts. 
After the passing of the Law in 2000, the 200 largest consumers (those with an annual 
demand more than 10
7 m
3 of gas, which represent 46% of total demand) were free to choose 
supplier and upon liberalisation, Gasunie lost 37% of this market. The middle segment 
(annual consumption more than 10
4 m
3 of gas) was liberalised in 2002 and the market will 
become fully open as of July 1, 2004. The market share of Gasunie has gradually decreased: 
100% in 1999, 82% in 2000, 79% in 2001, 77% in 2002, 74% in 2003; see ECN (2004). We 
note that, while the sales of Gasunie in the Dutch market have gradually decreased from 
around 44 billion m
3 until 1997 to 34 billion m
3 in 2003, exports have remained roughly 
constant around 43 billion m
3 per year; see www.gasunie.nl. 
 
  In 2001, the Minister of Economic Affairs argued that the existing structure and 
agreements in the gas sector would increasingly lead to tensions with European policy and he 
announced his intention to come to a complete restructuring of the “gas building” 
(Kamerstukken 2001- 2002d, nr 1). Not surprisingly, given the financial interests of the State, 
the letter stresses that the operation should be budgetary neutral for the State and that there 
should be no changes in production. Interestingly, the letter also states that privatisation is 
possible “if the public interest can be taken care of by means of regulation, and if production, 
transport and trade can be adequately separated”. As with electricity, policy would, however, 
move in the opposite direction. In the next letter on the topic (Kamerstukken, 2001-2002d, nr. 
2), the Minister proposed ownership unbundling, i.e. that Gasunie be split into three 
independent companies: one for transport and system operation (owned by the State), and two 
competing trade companies, one owned by ExxonMobil, the other by Shell. In effect, a 
similar structure as the one that exists for electricity was proposed. Valuation of the different 
parts of Gasunie proved difficult, however, and, in October 2003, after three years of 
negotiation, the parties concluded that they could not agree on unbundling the firm 
(Kamerstukken 2001-2002d, nr. 5). In the draft Law for implementing Directive 2003/55/EC, 
the Minister writes that it still is his intention to come to a full unbundling. Note, however,   37
that the Directive is satisfied with legal unbundling, that since 1999 Gasunie is already split in 
two divisions (“Gastransport Services” (GTS) and “Gasunie Trade and Supply”), hence, that 
legal unbundling can be easily achieved. If the experience from electricity is anything to go 
by, going further and nationalising “GTS” could be a costly business for the State.  
 
6. PUBLIC  TRANSPORT 
 
On January 1, 2004, the transport chamber of the NMa, the organisation supervising 
the public transport sector, officially started its operations. In this Section, we describe the 
relevant laws (two for train transport and one for bus transport) and the current situation in 
this sector. 
 
6.1. Train  Services 
 
In 2003, Dutch parliament adopted two new laws that implement the “second 
package” of measures to revitalise the railways that were adopted by the European 
Commission on 23 January 2002. The first of these laws, the “Spoorwegwet” (Kamerstukken  
2000-2001b) establishes full unbundling of infrastructure and service provision, with the first 
being the responsibility of the SOE Prorail. The second law, the “Concessiewet 
personenvervoer per trein” (Kamerstukken 1999-2000b, 27216) arranges that passenger 
traffic will be governed by a competitive (exclusive) licensing system, hence, that there will 
be (limited) competition for the rails. Specifically, until 2015 the concession for the “core 
network” will be granted to NS, a stare owned enterprise, while smaller lines will be 
contracted out on competitive basis, and the high speed connection between Amsterdam and 
Brussels (that will start running in 2007) having been tendered to a joint venture of KLM and 
NS until 2022. We here briefly describe how this structure came about.  
 
  When during the 1980s, in both passenger and freight traffic, the position of rail 
transport deteriorated, the Dutch government set up the Wijffels Committee to come up with 
recommendations about how to increase the share of rail transport in the total transport 
market. In its 1992 report, that committee recommended to loosen the relation between NS 
(the Dutch Railroads) and the State, i.e. to give NS room to transform itself into a “normal” 
business and to make the State responsible for rail infrastructure. The government accepted 
the recommendations and a process of reducing the direct government influence on the   38
company was started. In June 1995, NS and the Dutch State signed the agreement “Over de 
wissel”, which also aimed at implementing EU Directive 91/440/EC that required accounting 
separation between infrastructure and train service provision. The agreement stated that, in 
return for the government no longer providing subsidies for passenger transport, NS was 
given more freedom to determine the time schedule and the tariffs.  
 
Since 1995, the price of train tickets has roughly increased with the rate of inflation. 
Subsidies, which amounted to some € 200 million in 1992 (of which more than 60% were 
exploitation subsidies), were reduced considerably, with operational subsidies not being given 
as of 1998; instead, as of 1996, NS started to pay for using the infrastructure, the tariff being € 
84 million in 2003. While the subsidies were reduced, the cost recovery ratio increased from 
50% in 1992 to 100% at the end of the 1990s, with NS making profits (of around 4% of 
turnover, yielding a return on investment around 1%) since 1995. From 1995 until 2000 also 
the passenger transport division made small annual profits, but since 2001 that division is 
slightly in the red, mainly as a result of international transport being unprofitable, this as a 
consequence of cheap international flights. For example, in 2003, on total turnover of € 2.7 
billion, NS made a profit of € 81 million with the passenger transport division making a loss 
of € 37 million on a turnover of € 1.6 billion (58% of the NS total); see the Annual Report 
over 2003, available at www.ns.nl. From a pure financial perspective, the 1995 “hiving off” 
of the NS can thus be classified as a remarkable success. No doubt, the government plan, 
announced in the 1998 policy document “De derde eeuw spoor” (Third century of rail), of 
privatising NS, contributed to the company improving its operating efficiency considerably. 
 
On the other side, as far as quality of service is concerned, the record has not been so 
good. With the company aiming that at least 87% of the trains arrive on time (that is, with a 
delay of less than 3 minutes), that goal has not been achieved since 1996. In fact, the quality 
level has been around 83%, with 2001 setting the record low with 79.9%. Clearly, passengers 
were very dissatisfied with this performance. In 2003, this led consumer organisers to block a 
tariff increase of 4.15% that NS had planned. The company agreed that it would increase 
tariffs only after quality had gone up; it would increase price by 2.075% only after quality had 
been above 84.4% for 12 consecutive months and, counting from that point in time, to 
increase with a further 2.075% only after quality had been above 86.6% for another 12 
consecutive months. Most recently, NS reported that in 2004Q1 85.3% of the trains had a 
delay of less than 3 minutes, hence, the company is now allowed to increase its prices. Note,   39
however, that the quality is still below the standard that the company has set for itself. 
Dissatisfaction with performance has led to the conclusion that privatisation of NS is 
unthinkable at the moment: the political consensus is that this could only make matters worse. 
 
The 1995 contract made the State responsible for general policy concerning 
infrastructure investment and track use, but it delegated the associated operational tasks 
(maintenance, capacity allocation and traffic management) to NS. In effect, NS was made into 
a “hybrid company”, consisting of a public arm and a market organisation. The public arm 
consisted of three “task organisations” that were responsible for building and maintaining the 
infrastructure (Railinfrabeheer NV), entry to the tracks, capacity allocation and safety 
(Railned BV) and operational traffic management (Verkeersleiding BV). While these task 
organisations are structured according to private law, the Annual Reports of NS refer to them 
as being non-profit oriented, and financed by and working on behalf of the government. The 
market organisation of NS, NS Groep, originally consisted of divisions for passengers, 
freight, stations, real estate and supporting services, but in 1999, NS Cargo, the freight 
division, was sold to Deutsche Bahn. (The freight market, which has been fully liberalised 
since 1995, and in which there is competition on the tracks, will not be considered here.) The 
private arm of NS has always pointed to the public, infrastructure, branch of the company for 
being partly responsible for the low quality of service and for consumer satisfaction being 
low. In 1999, a report of the General Audit Chamber (Kamerstukken 1998-1999c) indeed put 
part of the blame for the low quality on the government and the three task organisations. It 
concluded that the Ministry of Transport had not adequately supervised the public task 
organisations of NS and that there were coordination problems between these three 
organisations. 
 
While the 1995 agreement stated that the intention was to have competition on the 
tracks, it is clear that the hybrid structure that was chosen was not conducive for such 
competition to develop. Indeed, the report of the General Audit chamber also concluded that 
the task organisations were not always operating independently from the rest of the company; 
in fact, on several occasions the Board of NS had directly influenced them, without the 
Ministry intervening. One new player entered by exploiting a line that had been abandoned by 
NS, however, when it was not allocated more capacity it quickly left the market again. A 
review of the political discussion (Kamerstukken 1995-1996, 18986, nr. 18, p. 28-31), makes 
clear that the importance of the true independence of the task organisations for competition to   40
develop was probably underestimated. For passenger transport, the idea of competition on the 
tracks has meanwhile been given up as well; the choice now is for competition for the tracks. 
 
As a result of general dissatisfaction of the public the quality of with train transport 
services, a second step of “unbundling” has since taken place. In 2000, a process started of 
lifting the three task organisations out of NS and bundling them into a separate 100% state-
owned limited liability company, ProRail, that falls directly under the control of the Transport 
Ministry. In the meantime, the government has also changed its views on competition: it has 
concluded that competition on the tracks is not feasible and has settled for competition for the 
tracks on the basis of a concession system. While it was intended to have a new structure in 
place by 2000, the transition will be completed only in 2005. The General Audit Office has 
criticised the Ministry for not having a clear vision of the appropriate structure and for having 
caused this delay.  
 
  It is the system sketched above that is formalised in the new “Spoorwegwet”. This 
Law formally establishes the SOE ProRail, which will be fully independent as of January 
2005, and it implements full separation between infrastructure services, to be provided by 
ProRail, and transport services, which fall under the responsibility of the state-owned 
company NS. The “Concessiewet” that deals with traffic services distinguishes between three 
sub-markets: the high-speed connection Amsterdam-Brussels-Paris, the core rail-network in 
the Netherlands, and the regional lines. For each of these three, concessions will be, or are, 
given out, but details differ somewhat. For the high speed-services, a competitive tender has 
been organised, with the winner being a consortium of NS and KLM. For the core network a 
contract, with duration till 2015 and performance clauses, has been negotiated with NS. For 
the regional lines, it is intended to shift authority to the regions themselves so that better 
integration with other forms of regional transport can be established. These regional 
authorities can give subsidies if they consider this to be necessary. In this domain, relatively 
little progress has been made. 
 
6.2.  Public Bus Transport 
 
On January 1, 2001, a new law on public bus transport (the “Wet Personenvervoer 
2000”, Kamerstukken, 1998-1999b) came into effect. The aim of the law is to increase the 
quality of public bus transport, to increase the share of that transport in the total mobility   41
market, and to increase cost coverage to at least 50%. The simple idea underlying the law is 
that more competition within the public bus market will make bus transport more competitive 
vis à vis alternatives. In this section, we describe the current market structure in this sector. 
 
The regional public bus transport industry started with competition between bus 
companies, but these merged one after the other. Already in 1937, NS bought up a number of 
the regional transport companies, and transformed them into VSN. In 1969 the State took over 
the shares in VSN, which at the time had a monopoly on regional public bus transport. When, 
in the mid 1990s, the sector was in severe trouble (ticket receipts only covered about 30% of 
cost, direct labour costs were about 7% higher than in other countries, and indirect labour 
costs might have been even 40% higher), the government installed the committee Brokx to 
advise on how to restructure the sector. After two tender experiments had been successfully 
conducted in 1995, this committee recommended to split the Netherlands in several regions 
and to tender local monopoly licenses in each of these.  
 
The “Law Passenger Transport 2000” implements the proposals of the Brokx 
committee. It creates 35 regional public transport authorities, RTA’s, (12 provinces, 7 areas 
and 16 cities) which are made responsible for public transport in 81 different areas. The law 
introduces a 2-year learning period, in which the RTA’s can experiment with tendering, and it 
specifies a target level of 35% of the relevant market having been awarded through 
competitive tendering by the end of 2002. If this target is not met, the Minister can force the 
RTA’s to tender at least 35 % of the contract value from 2003 on, and the law’s premise is 
that by 2006 (2007 for cities) all licenses will be tendered competitively. We note that the 
licenses have a maximum duration of 6 years and that, until 2010, the winner of a tender is 
forced to take on board all bus drivers and other direct personnel of the company that was 
carrying out the transport in that area. Obviously, as labour costs are around 70% of total 
costs, this requirement can be major handicap for new entrants.  
 
At present, total turnover in the Dutch market for public transport is € 3.1 billion; the 
submarket for local and regional public transport (including tram and metro) has value € 1.7 
billion, of which € 1.2 billion is public bus transport; see Ecorys (2004). This latter market 
can be separated in bus transport in the major cities (€ 0.3 billion) and bus transport in other 
cities and regions (€ 0.9 billion), with only the latter market being contestable at the moment. 
In eight of the larger cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag, Utrecht, Groningen,   42
Dordrecht, Nijmegen and Maastricht), in the mid 1990s, local bus transport was carried out by 
a municipal organization. To prevent the conflict of interest resulting from such a city being 
active on both sides of a tender, these cities have been given time till 2006 to corporatise or 
privatise their local bus companies and open their markets. In fact, the Law forces the cities to 
at least corporatise their bus companies. Article 48 of the Law states that a bus company that 
is under the control of an RTA is not allowed to participate in the tender organised by that 
RTA, while Article 109 is a fair competition clause stating that, as long as its own local 
market has not been opened up sufficiently, a municipal bus company cannot participate in 
any tender. A similar reciprocity clause applies to foreign firms: if these are from countries 
that have not opened up their markets, they can be banned from the Dutch tenders. The city 
bus companies, however, found a loophole: they simply formed a joint venture, SVN that was 
not caught by the latter clause. At this point in time, three of the larger city bus companies, 
GVB (Amsterdam), RET (Rotterdam) and GVU (Utrecht) are still municipal units, and they 
have asked for the 2007 deadline to be shifted. The other local bus companies that existed in 
1996 have meanwhile been privatised. 
 
Privatisation is thus viewed as a necessary step to allow competition to develop. Of 
course, the fact that the market is contestable does not imply that competition will come 
about. There are only few (about 15) parties active on the Dutch market, most of these only 
on their home markets and the reciprocity clause clearly does not help in increasing the 
number of bidders. Around 1998, the 100% state-owned VSN (now Connexxion) had about 
90% of the market. As owner of VSN and as guardian of the public interest, the State thus had 
a double position. To make competition possible, in 1999, under the threat of banning the 
company from the tenders, it forced Connexxion to divest its business in the North, and this 
was bought by Arriva plc, a UK company. In 2001, in the South, BBA, a company in which 
Connexxion held 47% of the shares, the rest being held by several municipalities and a 
province, was privatised and sold to CGEA, the largest private bus company in Europe, a 
subsidiary of Vivendi. As a result, the share of Connexxion in the regional bus market has 
shrunk to 52% (74% in the contestable part). In the contestable part of the market, Arriva has 
15%, while BBA/Connex has 11%.  
 
It will be clear that in such a concentrated market, conditions for competition to 
develop are not the most favourable ones one could imagine. To help competition to develop, 
the Law gives the Minister the powers to refuse to give a license to a winner of a tender that   43
has too high a market share on the relevant market. In the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Law, percentages of 50 % (for the regional market) and 35 % (for the market including cities) 
are mentioned, but up to now, the relevant markets have not yet been identified and the 
clause, which would effectively have excluded Connexxion, has not yet been applied. Note 
that article 9 of the most recent (amended), February 21, 2002 version of the proposal of the 
European Commission for a Regulation on awarding public service contracts in transport 
specifies an even lower threshold: a tendering authority can decide not to award a contract to 
a company which would thereby get more than 25% of the relevant market; see European 
Commission (2002).  
 
RTA’s have been free to organise the tenders as they saw fit. They have been slow, 
however, and the goal of tendering 35% before 2003 has not been achieved. Nevertheless, 
thus far the Minister has not forced the RTA’s to tender more. One reason for lack of speed is 
that the RTA’s had to learn how to play the game and how to deal with strategic behaviour. 
For example, in the early tenders there was not a level playing field, as incumbents refused to 
reveal essential information about their labour force, and the courts had to step in. Until the 
summer of 2003, some 14 tenders have taken place (good for in total less than 10 % of the 
market). It should not come as surprise that the number of active bidders has been limited: in 
3 tenders, there were 4 competitors; in 6 there were 3 bidders; in 2 there were 2; and in the 
remaining 3 only the incumbent has bid. The incumbent has won the tender in all but four 
cases. In its Annual Report over 2002 (2003), Connexxion states that it participated, as 
incumbent, in five (six) tenders, of which it lost two (none); in 2003, the company also 
participated once as entrant, but it did lost that tender. The company also states that it views 
the market as being very competitive and that in 2003 and 2004 approximately 40-50% of its 
turnover in the public bus market (€ 680 million) will be involved in tender procedures. As 
the data show, however, most incumbents have been successful in defending their home 
markets. 
 
Detailed information about the improvements (in price and quality) achieved as a 
result of the tenders is not publicly available, although KPMG (2002) presents some details 
on three tenders, and suggests that cost savings or quality improvements have been obtained. 
It is probably still too early to do a serious evaluation, but the Minster has committed to do a 
first evaluation of the tenders that have taken place before the end of 2004.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
  In the Netherlands, privatisation is defined differently from the international 
convention: it is the process of transferring activities from the government to the private 
sector, including the non-profit sector. As in the Netherlands, there has always been a 
consensus that the primary role of the government is to create the right conditions to allow 
individuals and firms to go about their own business and to correct market failures, there is a 
long and strong tradition of such privatisation. On the other hand, in the Netherlands, selling 
shares of State participations traditionally was not classified as privatisation since these 
SOE’s have always largely been run as ordinary business firms, hence, pure transfer of 
ownership was not considered to influence the outcome. 
 
  As a result of the necessity to form coalition governments, privatisation policy has 
always been pragmatic. Remarkably, in the Netherlands, this pragmatism has not led to 
privatisation policy having a strong empirical basis. Already at the beginning of the 1980s, 
observers noted that remarkably few hard data were available about the effects of privatisation 
and increasing competition; see Boorsma (1984). When preparing this paper, I came to the 
same conclusion: very little information is in the public domain. While in the general 
discussion in the Netherlands, reference has been made to economic surveys such as 
Megginson et al. (2001) and Winston (1993) that document the efficiency gains that can be 
obtained from privatisation and deregulation, public debate in the Netherlands has not been 
much informed by local data. In this respect, I can only join in the chorus of the earlier writers 
and hope that there will be more empirical research in the future. As shown in this paper, the 
practical experiences from the last two decades have shown that both pure contractual 
arrangements as well as government ownership have drawbacks; hence, pragmatic policy 
should be well informed about the trade-offs involved. 
 
  As illustrated in this paper, during the period covered, and especially in the period 
1994-1998, Dutch policy makers showed a very strong belief in market forces, leading to the 
idea that market liberalisation would be sufficient to establish a competitive market and to 
take care of the public interests, and a corresponding neglect for issues of market design and 
the transition from monopoly to market. While the Ministry of Finance defended the standard 
position that regulation of private business was the preferred alternative, and may have 
neglected the limits of contracting, the Ministry of Economics seems to have been drifting,   45
and it was not always able to adequately manage the transition process in various network 
sectors. In the implementation of EU Directives, there has frequently been lack of vision; 
policy was not in line with the recommendations that were contained in the economic 
literature at the time; in fact, economists did not seem to have much influence on 
microeconomic policy in this domain. Policy moved with the tide of the time and, as we have 
seen, the compromise solution that was reached frequently conflicted with the official policy 
stated on paper. In retrospect, not all decisions taken during that period have proved to be 
wise ones. 
 
  The government has learned from its mistakes and it has responded by setting up 
initiatives such as “the knowledge centre on network industries” that aim at sharing 
knowledge within the administration. At the same time, the lack of success with some 
privatisations have shown to Dutch economists that their services might be useful here. 
Although the number of Dutch economists working in the area of industrial organisation and 
regulatory economics is still small, thanks to specific government subsidies, such as those to 
the ENCORE network (www.encore.nl), the number is increasing and we may expect that in 
the next decades, Dutch microeconomic policy, while remaining pragmatic, will be better 
informed about economic insights as it has been in the last decade of the 20
th century. 
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APPENDIX: State participations between 1 january 1997 and 1 november 2001  
 
A first group consists of publicly traded companies in which the state still holds a 
minority share, either for political reasons (KLM is an example) or since the time has not yet 
been ripe to sell the remaining shares. These companies are on the divestiture path, and some 
have been divested in the mean time. This group simply shows illustrates practical 
difficulties, it does not contradict the general policy line. Secondly, there are financial 
institutions and regional development companies, which serve as instruments to facilitate 
business and to attract investments. These companies being on the list is in line with the 
general preference of the Dutch State to finance that was mentioned in the Introduction. Note 
that also the Dutch Central Bank (DNB), although an institution with public responsibilities, 
has been set up as a private limited liability company. Thirdly, there are companies in the 
energy sector, including those dealing with exploration and transportation of gas, and TenneT, 
the TSO for the electricity market that is also responsible for the high voltage electricity grid.  
Fourthly, there are companies in the transport sector, besides the airports, a harbour, and a 
public private partnership for constructing and exploiting a tunnel, there are the Dutch 
railroads (NS) and a bus company (Connexxion), to which we return in Section 6. Finally, the 
fifth category is somewhat of a mixed bag, containing the former state firms that have been 
transformed into participations (DNM, SDU), some public broadcasting companies, waste 
disposal companies and Twinning, an incubator for ‘new economy’ companies, that the state 
set up since the market did not do this.   53
 




Listed on stock exchange        
TNT Post Groep NV  1997  NV  -  34,90 
Koninklijke KPN NV  1989  NV  44,30  34,69 
PinkRoccade NV  1990  NV  100,00  28,40 
Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV  1920  NV  25,00  14,10 
Koninklijke Hoogovens NV  1918 NV 11,50  - 
Internationale Nederlanden Groep NV  1991  NV  0,90  0,80 
Alpinvest Holding NV *  1991 NV 30,30  - 
Financial Institutions        
De Nederlandsche Bank NV  1864  NV  100,00  100,00 
NV Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten  1914  NV  50,00  50,00 
NV Nederlandse Waterschapsbank  1954  NV  17,20  17,20 
Financierings-Mij.Ontwikkelingslanden NV  1970  NV  51,00  51,00 
CF Kantoor voor Staatsobligaties BV  1973  BV  100,00  100,00 
MTS Amsterdam NV  1999  NV  -  5,00 
NIB Capital Bank NV  1945  NV  50,20  14,66 
Regional Development Companies        
NV Brabantse Ontwikkelingsmaatschappijj  1983  NV  64,50  64,50 
NV Gelderse Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij  1979  NV  66,60  66,60 
NV Industriebank LIOF  1935  NV  94,30  94,30 
NV Noordelijke Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij  1974  NV  99,97  99,97 
NV Overijsselse Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij  1975  NV  74,30  74,30 
Energy        
Energie Beheer Nederland BV  1973  BV  100,00  100,00 
NV Nederlandse Gasunie  1963  NV  10,00  10,00 
Ultra Centrifuge Nederland NV  1969  NV  98,90  98,90 
Nl. Onderneming voor Energie en Milieu  1976  BV 100,00  100,00 
BV Nederlandse Pijpleiding Maatschappij  1966  BV  50,00  50,00 
Tennet BV  1998  BV  -  100,00 
Saranne BV  2001  BV  -  100,00 
Transport & Infrastructure        
NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen   1937  NV  100,00  100,00 
VSN NV (Connexxion)  1994  NV  -  100,00 
NV Luchthaven Schiphol  1958  NV  75,80  75,80 
NV Luchthaven Maastricht   1956  NV  34,80  34,80 
Groningen Airport Eelde NV  1956  NV  80,00  80,00 
NV Luchtvaartterrein Texel   1956  NV  65,30  65,30 
Haven van Vlissingen NV  1934  NV  35,50  - 
NV Westerscheldetunnel  1998  NV  -  95,40 
Other        
Koninklijke Nederlandse Munt NV  1994  NV  100,00  100,00   54
NV Nederlands Inkoop Centrum  1990  NV  100,00  100,00 
Arbo Management Groep BV  1997  BV  48,00  - 
NV SDU  1988  NV  100,00  100,00 
Thales Nederland BV   1989  BV  1,00  1,00 
Eurometaal Holding NV  1993  NV  33,33  13,20 
Centrale Organisatie voor Radio-actief Afval   1982  NV  10,00  10,00 
Vuil Afvoer Maatschappij NV.  1929  NV  99,97  - 
AVR Chemie BV  1984  BV  30,00  30,00 
DLV Groep NV  1993  NV  -  82,50 
Twinning Holding BV  1998  BV  -  100,00 
NOB Holding NV  1999  NV  -  100,00 
NederlandseOmroepzendermaatschappij NV  1935  NV  59,00  59,00 
Holland Weer Services BV  1999  BV  -  100,00 
Holland Metrology NV  1995  NV  100,00  - 
 